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POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE RESUMPTION OF LABOR MIGRATION  
TO WESTERN EUROPE

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This article argues that traditional, labor migration flows to Western Europe are unlikely to resume in the near future and the European Community's free movement of labor policy is likely to erode in light of the recent advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism in Western Europe. Anti-immigrant illiberalism in several, major labor-importing states is evident in: 1) the semi-permanent politicization of state immigration policy; 2) the surge of support for xenophobic political forces; 3) the appropriation of anti-immigrant votes by established political parties of the right; and 4) the abandonment by left parties of liberal immigration and immigrant welfare policies.

## POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE RESUMPTION OF LABOR MIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE

A decade and a half has passed since the state-sponsored recruitment of foreign workers to Western Europe came to an end. Beginning with the 1973 oil shock and the prolonged economic recession which soon followed, the major labor-importing states in Western Europe suspended mass immigration and the employment of foreigners. As Rogers has correctly observed, the suspension of organized, state-sponsored immigration in the early 1970s did not curtail all new immigration. Superimposed upon the more visible and measurable trends of "family reunification of year-round migrants in the host countries, the sporadic admittance of 'new' year-round migrant workers from the old recruitment countries, and the traditional situation of free movement of labor" during the late 1970s and 1980s were less noticeable patterns "in the contemporary European migratory system, such as seasonal migration, border commuting, asylum requests and refugee movements, illegal migration, and migrations in the increasingly wider spheres of free movement of labor" (Rogers, 1985: 288). Nevertheless, by the late 1970s most West European governments and major employers had ceased to recruit foreign labor actively and several governments were facilitating the voluntary repatriation of previously settled workers (See, Friedlander, 1985). Into and throughout the 1980s sluggish economic growth has combined with high unemployment and often virulent anti-immigrant, public sentiment to reduce the flow of year-round foreign workers into the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe.

The central question we wish to raise but, for obvious reasons, cannot answer definitively is whether the mass flow of migrant labor to Western Europe, after having been suspended for so long, can be resumed in the near future. That is, in the somewhat unlikely event that West European economies again experience high economic growth rates and near full employment, can traditional sources of foreign labor be retapped? Although these are hypothetical questions, addressing them is not merely an academic exercise. For, in raising these questions, we are implicitly asking what political costs might accompany the full economic and political integration of a country like Turkey, a traditional labor-exporting state, into the European Community (EC). Indeed, we are also raising the issue of whether a future European Community of thirteen or fourteen mostly rich and several obviously much poorer members can indefinitely allow the free movement of labor within its borders without precipitating severe, internal political tensions.

Our central argument is that previous labor migration patterns are unlikely to resume and the EC's commitment to the free movement of labor within its borders will likely erode in the near future as a consequence of anti-immigrant illiberalism having become 'embedded' since the mid-1970s in the domestic politics of several major labor-importing West European countries. The embeddedness of anti-immigrant illiberalism in West European politics is evident in: 1) the semi-permanent politicization of state immigration policy; 2) the modest surge of popular and/or electoral support for xenophobic movements and political parties; 3) the deliberate appropriation of anti-immigrant votes by established, respectable parties of the conservative right; and 4) the

abandonment by left parties of liberal immigration and immigrant welfare policies. Together these trends have converged to foster an unfavorable political climate for the renewal of mass labor migration to Western Europe and to obstruct, in the short term at least, the full economic, political, and social integration of the approximately 14.5 million already settled, ethnic and racial immigrant minorities (Table 1). Continuing domestic problems of ethnic and racial minority integration diminish in turn the prospect that a new, more liberal immigration regime will emerge in Western Europe.

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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

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THE POLITICIZATION OF STATE IMMIGRATION POLICY

Perhaps the most significant political factor impeding the resumption of previous labor migration patterns is the semi-permanent politicization of state immigration policy in Western Europe. By state immigration policy being politicized we mean simply that in contrast to the period (mostly before 1970) when European publics were unaware of state immigration policy, when it was not an electoral issue, and when it was conceived and implemented in relatively closed arenas by civil servants, bureaucrats, and economic planners, immigration policy is now widely known to the public, debated during electoral campaigns and in relatively open arenas (like legislatures), and scrutinized by politicians, extra-parliamentary pressure groups, the mass media, and very often, organized labor.

The politicization of state immigration policy in West Germany after 1975 is a significant case in point. Until the 1973 oil shock, and even some time after it, West German immigration policy was exclusively the concern of the executive; the political parties and the Parliament in West Germany were largely excluded from the decision-making process. Katzenstein (1987: 213) observes that "until the late 1970s West Germany's migrant labor policy was remarkable for the lack of public debate it provoked." However, with the suspension of the German "economic miracle" and the expansion of the foreign resident population to over four million during the 1970s, the immigration issue became politically salient in West Germany, thus forcing "policy-makers to confront the social consequences of decisions made largely for economic reasons" (Hoskin and Fitzgerald, 1987). Since the early 1980s opinion polls indicate that over three-quarters of West Germans believe that there are too many foreigners in their country and over 40 percent of the electorate agrees that foreign workers should be repatriated when unemployment is high (Hoskin and Fitzgerald, 1987). A series of provocative events, such as the publication of the inflammatory "Heidelberg Manifesto" by a group of prominent intellectuals and the anti-immigrant comments of Prime Minister Helmut Kohl and other major, German political party leaders, have substantially raised the public visibility of state immigration policy in West Germany during the 1980s (Bendix, 1985). Indeed, it would probably be no exaggeration to state that few West Germans are unaware of or indifferent to state immigration policy. A similar conclusion could also be reached about the British and French electorate (See, Freeman, 1979; 1986).

The politicization of state immigration policy in Western Europe impedes the resumption of previous labor migration patterns for two reasons. First, before state immigration policy in countries such as Britain and West Germany can be significantly altered (i.e. liberalized) proposed changes must be debated publicly. In a very significant sense the immigration issue is unlike most questions of public policy. In no West European country can politicians or political parties gain votes by favoring new immigration and in virtually every country thousands, and often millions, of votes could be and probably would be lost. In regard to West Germany Hoskin and Fitzgerald (1987) argue that the major political parties "cannot confess to liking the influx of immigrants, even if they can often see an advantage to their arrival or a real cost to trying to shut them out." In short, widespread public opposition to immigration combines with the high visibility of the issue to obstruct liberal change in public policy.

Second, because state immigration policy is politicized liberal change can be fairly easily obstructed by a small minority of immigration opponents. The opponents of immigration have the political advantage because in any future conflict over the direction of immigration policy the forces against new immigration could mobilize far more votes and political resources than the proponents of liberal change. The considerable mobilizing capacity of the opponents of immigration is not simply due to the hostility of European publics toward immigrants, although this is an important factor, but because these publics are already aware of the issue, do not require additional education, and must simply be persuaded to support the policy status



quo. On the other hand, the prospective advocates of liberalization would be faced with the formidable and time-consuming task of re-educating or, in some countries, educating the public on the benefits of immigration and justifying change in the status quo. Needless to say, if European publics were less aware of state immigration policies and if state decisions in this area of public policy could be implemented without the approval of political parties and the legislature the liberalization of immigration policy would be far easier to effect. It is no surprise, therefore, that those who oppose new immigration are working diligently to keep immigration and immigrant-related issues in the political spotlight (New Statesman, 1987).

#### THE SURGE OF XENOPHOBIC GROUPS, MOVEMENTS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES

At the forefront of this effort are xenophobic groups, movements, and political parties. The surge of xenophobic forces in Western Europe in recent years should not be overemphasized or exaggerated. In no West European country are these forces capable of forcing radical changes in national immigration or immigrant welfare policy. None are on the verge of a major electoral breakthrough. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that since the early 1970s the political climate in Western Europe has become much more favorable for extreme right forces -- in some countries referred to as the "New Right" (Cohen et.al., 1986) In several countries these forces have achieved modest political and/or electoral advances.

For example, the British National Front (NF), at the peak of its popularity during the late 1970s, enjoyed the implicit support of as

much as 15 percent of the electorate. In one opinion survey conducted in 1978 21 percent of all respondents agreed that it would be "good for Britain" if the Front gained seats in the House of Commons (Harrop et.al., 1980). Between 1972 and 1978 it was not unusual for National Front candidates to receive between 8 and 16 percent of the vote in local elections and parliamentary by-elections. In the 1979 general election 303 National Front candidates garnered 191,000 votes.

In somewhat parallel circumstances in France, the French National Front (FN) has emerged as a significant political force since 1983. In the June 1984 elections for the European Parliament the National Front list, headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen, attracted almost 10 percent of the vote. Five months following the election the percentage of sympathizers of the FN in the electorate surged from 18 to 23 (Schain, 1987). In the national parliamentary elections held in 1986 the FN won 35 seats and 9.8 percent of the vote, as exit polls conducted during the election revealed ominously that 67 percent of all voters who supported the National Front in 1984 remained loyal in 1986. In April, 1988 Le Pen shook the political foundations of French conservatism by garnering 14.4 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections. In the city of Marseilles the National Front standard bearer emerged as the most popular presidential candidate with 28.3 percent of the vote. Although the FN lost all but one of its 35 seats in the National Assembly after the most recent parliamentary elections in June, 1988, this result was not due to a significant erosion in its electoral appeal. The National Front received 9.6 percent of the vote in 1988, approximately the same electoral support that the party had received two

years earlier, but a change in the electoral system in 1988 denied the FN significant representation in Parliament.

In West Germany public violence against settled immigrants is visibly on the rise. The violence is fueled in part by the modest growth of neo-Nazi and New Right groups which are splintered into 74 separate organizations with 22,000 total members. The most significant group, with approximately 16,000 members, is the German Peoples Union (DVU) led by Gerhard Frey. The next largest group, with 6100 members, is the National Democratic Party (NPD). The NPD may have had its electoral heyday before 1970: in 1969 the party received 4.3 percent of the vote in the federal elections as compared to 0.6 percent of the vote the NPD garnered in 1987. However, the NPD's performance in the March, 1988 Baden-Wurttemberg state elections, where it received 2.1 percent of the vote, has revived the spirits of the party's leaders. On the extreme, neo-Nazi right are the Free German Workers Party (FAP) and other groups (New Statesman, 1987; Castles, et. al., 1984).

In Denmark, the anti-tax, Progress party increased its national representation in Parliament in September, 1987 from 4 to 9 after a hostile electoral campaign against guest workers and especially Iranian and Lebanese refugees. The party's parliamentary delegation expanded further to 16 after the May, 1988 general election. The Norwegian Progress party, with two seats in the Storting and 12 percent of the vote in recent local elections, has also successfully exploited the popular backlash against settled immigrants. In a recent public opinion survey the Norwegian party scored over 23 percent, as compared with the 3.1 percent of the vote it received in the 1985 general election (The

Economist, 1988).

The modest surge of popular and/or electoral support for these and other xenophobic groups in Western Europe (Table 2) is significant for two major reasons. First, as existing vehicles of anti-immigrant and anti-immigration popular expression, these groups are patiently waiting to be more fully utilized and embraced. Most of these groups are poised to attract additional popular support and to capitalize politically on any shift toward a more liberal immigration regime in Western Europe. Second, the existence of these groups is preventing established, 'respectable' parties of the right and center-right from moving too far away from anti-immigration positions. In Sartori-like fashion the xenophobic groups are pulling the established, conservative parties further to the right on immigration as part of a general process of political outflanking or outbidding (Sartori, 1977: 139-144). In several cases, the conservative parties fear losing votes to these xenophobic groups or ceding to them control over the public debate on immigration and immigrants. In either event, the probability that mass migration to Western Europe will be renewed is diminished considerably.

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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

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THE APPROPRIATION OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT VOTES BY RIGHT AND CENTER-RIGHT  
PARTIES

In virtually every West European country where public sentiment against

immigration is pervasive and popular support for far right groups is insignificant or declining, it is because the established, conservative parties are unambiguously opposed to new immigration and illiberal toward settled immigrants. The British case is a classic example. In contrast to the early to mid-1960s when it was fairly liberal on immigration and concerned about the social welfare of settled workers, the British Conservative party of the 1980s is staunchly opposed to immigration and illiberal toward the new ethnic minorities settled in the U.K. (Layton-Henry, 1984: 147-165; Messina, 1985). The reasons behind the transformation of the Conservative party are complex. The party's shift in policy is at least partly a response to the pressure of illiberal opinion within the British electorate. However, this is hardly the whole and perhaps not even most of the story, the rest of which we will elaborate upon below. At this point we wish to stress that the Conservative party's illiberalism on immigration and immigrant welfare is probably the key reason why the British National Front declined in popular and electoral support during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Messina, 1987). Indeed, it could be argued that as long, and perhaps only so long, as the Conservative party remains illiberal the British National Front is unlikely to revive as a political movement.

The appropriation of the National Front's illiberal platform by the Conservative party has not been accomplished without cost. In addition to the fact that primary migration to the U.K. from outside the EC has all but ended and Britain has some of the most xenophobic nationality and immigration laws in Western Europe, is the reality that the success

of the Conservative party in appropriating anti-immigrant votes has driven the National Front and other far right groups into the streets where they have incited racial violence (Home Office, 1981; Layton-Henry, 1984: 108-121). Thus, settled immigrant workers and their dependents in Britain ultimately pay for the political decline of the National Front in two ways: first, with the imposition of restrictive immigration and nationality laws which obstruct family reunification; and second, as frequent victims of racial attacks. Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising that some settled workers and their families in Britain remain open to returning to Pakistan, India, the West Indies, and other countries of origin (Time, 1984).

The British Conservative party is certainly not unique in Western Europe. To one degree or another its illiberal orientation and behavior toward settled immigrants have been mimicked by the Christian Democratic party in West Germany, the Gaullists and UDF in France, and other West European right and center-right political parties (Castles et. al., 1984; New York Times, 1988). In all these cases the respectable political right has become so closely identified in the public mind with anti-immigration and illiberal immigrant policies, and in many instances benefitted electorally from these policies, that it is extremely unlikely that it would support new immigration in the foreseeable future.

#### THE ABANDONMENT OF LIBERAL POLICIES BY LEFT PARTIES

Perhaps the greatest change in the domestic context in which state immigration policy is conceived and implemented in Western Europe is the

quiet acceptance of restrictive immigration policies by established parties of the left and, in some instances, their abandonment of liberal, immigrant welfare policies. To be sure, this trend is not universal. The Dutch Labour party (PvdA), for example, has recently promised to improve the social welfare of settled foreign workers. As a result, in the 1986 local elections in The Netherlands non-national immigrants, granted limited suffrage since 1983, overwhelmingly voted Labour. Also, the British Labour party, after distancing itself between 1964 and 1975 from the aspirations of recently settled immigrants, has actively courted ethnic minority voters during the 1980s (Messina, 1985). Nevertheless, in several major countries, most notably in France and West Germany, established left political parties have moved away from supporting a liberal immigration regime and distanced themselves politically from settled workers. In France, this process has reached its logical and somewhat bizarre extreme: the French Communist party now competes with the National Front for anti-immigrant votes (Schain, 1987).

The quiet acceptance of an illiberal immigration regime by the left and its abandonment of liberal, immigrant welfare policies has had at least two major consequences. First, it has shifted the public debate on immigration policy in Western Europe so far to the right that in most countries only a more liberal family reunification policy is possible in the near future -- regardless of economic conditions. In the absence of a concrete alternative to the current, restrictive immigration regime it is difficult to see how any government or party -- including the left -- could construct one in the near future. Second, the illiberal drift of

the left on immigration and immigrant welfare policy has reinforced the legitimacy of the views of the far right. The illiberal drift of the left has especially encouraged the white working class and more than a few trade unions to blame foreign workers for high, domestic unemployment.

#### ANTI-IMMIGRANT ILLIBERALISM AND THE CONSERVATIVE PROJECT

At this point we must link the above trends to larger macro-political and economic developments in Western Europe during the 1980s. Specifically, our analysis suggests the following questions: don't the trends which we have identified alter, and possibly reverse, if full employment and general prosperity return to Western Europe? Don't West European political parties and publics become more receptive to liberal immigration policies and become more tolerant of immigrants during a sustained upturn in the economy? Why is anti-immigrant illiberalism necessarily embedded in the domestic politics of Western Europe?

These questions return us to the British case and the motives of the Conservative party, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, in appropriating the platform of the British National Front during the late 1970s. The apparent motive was short-term, electoral gain. As the Conservatives had lost four of five previous general elections, there was some pressure within the party to collect votes from wherever it could -- even on the xenophobic right. Both private and public opinion polls in the mid-1970s indicated the electoral gains that could be achieved if the party became explicitly hostile toward immigrants (Layton-Henry, 1984: 150). Such gains would have been especially



welcome given the near even popular support of the major political parties at the time. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the leaders of the Conservative party were concerned about losing votes to the National Front, especially in certain electorally marginal, parliamentary constituencies. When asked in January, 1978 whether she hoped to woo defectors to the National Front back to the Conservative party Thatcher replied:

Oh, very much back, certainly, but I think that the National Front has, in fact, attracted more people from Labour voters than from us; but never be afraid to tackle something which people are worried about. We are not in politics to ignore people's worries: we are in politics to deal with them (The Times, 1978).

These remarks, coupled with Thatcher's infamous and premeditated reference to the "swamping" of Britain by people of different cultures, were a fairly transparent attempt by the Conservative party leader to steal the anti-immigrant clothes of the National Front.

However, short-term, electoral gain was probably not the principal reason why the Conservative party appropriated the National Front's platform, as this motive does not explain why, after the National Front collapsed politically in 1979 and the Conservatives won landslide general election victories in 1983 and 1987, the party has not become more liberal. Indeed, Britain currently has the fastest growing economy in Western Europe, declining unemployment, and over the past four years

or so has experienced a mini-economic boom. Yet, petty barriers to new immigration were enacted by Thatcher's Conservative government as recently as November, 1987 (New Society, 1987). Paradoxically, in a country where undiluted liberalism has been revived as a governing ideology and under a proselytizing, free market government a trickle of foreign workers and the dependents of settled immigrants are being vigorously excluded from entry into Britain.

Rather, the illiberal direction of immigration and immigrant welfare policies in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe is primarily a consequence of the ascendancy of what might be labelled the 'conservative project.' The essential features of this project are well known and have been the focus of considerable scholarship (See, Bosanquet, 1983; Burnham, 1978; Hall, 1986; Krieger, 1986). At its core the conservative project is an attempt by conservative forces in Western Europe to restructure the state and society so as to revitalize the economy and make private capital more profitable. It is associated with an intellectual attack on the principles underpinning the postwar, Keynesian-social welfare consensus in Western Europe and a return by governments to more market-oriented, economic policies. As a necessary and direct consequence of this project, consensus politics breaks down, ideological conflict heats up, and "economic sacrifice as apportioned by the market ... [falls] ... predominantly on those who lack the market power to protect themselves - young school leavers, immigrants, the unskilled, and older workers in declining sectors" (Hall, 1986: 283). Dissatisfaction and disillusion among the native 'losers' of this project are muted somewhat by the promotion by elites and the

consumption by publics of a governing political ideology which emphasizes individualism, self-initiative, national pride, and the potential threat to the 'nation' from internal enemies. As Hall (1986: 136) argues with respect to the political orientation of the Conservative governments under Thatcher:

The strategy chosen by the Thatcher government has been ... exclusionary and conflictual ...

Higher levels of social conflict were the natural result of policies that renounced bargaining in favor of more unilateral state action; but there has also been an element of deliberate divisiveness in the strategy. The Prime Minister practices a 'politics of friends and enemies' designed to win support by rallying national opposition to a few groups designated as antagonists. Prominent among the latter were international foes ... but several internal groups have also been treated as enemies of the nation, including inner-city rioters, football hooligans, drug dealers, and striking trade unions.

At its most benign, the politics of friends and enemies distracts native losers of the conservative project from discovering the primary source of their difficulties. At its most malignant, the politics of friends and enemies inflames latent antagonisms among the various races and classes. At every point between these poles the eventual success of the conservative project is facilitated.

Freeman argues that postwar migration has eroded the political

consensus on which the postwar welfare state in Western Europe rests. His thesis is that mass migration "reduced the political clout of those social strata that have traditionally been the chief source of support for welfare state development," thus precipitating "the Americanization of European welfare politics." Specifically, postwar, mass migration "diminished the power of organized labor by dividing the working class into national and immigrant camps, by easing the tight labor market conditions that would have enhanced labor's strategic resources, and by provoking a resurgence of right-wing and nativist political movements" (1986: 61). This thesis has obvious merit, but it essentially misses the mark. On the whole, support for the welfare state in Western Europe has not diminished considerably since the mid-1970s, even in the United Kingdom where the Conservative party has been continuously in government for a decade (Curtice, 1987). Moreover, it could be argued that it is not so much the presence of foreign workers in Western Europe which has undermined political support for the welfare state but, rather, a conservative-led attack on the welfare state which has heated up the ideological temperature of European politics and fostered a favorable climate for immigrant bashing and an unfavorable climate for the initiation of significant, new immigration. In its zeal to rally popular support for the goals of the conservative project and to undermine the Keynesian-social welfare consensus, the conservative right in Western Europe has deliberately and somewhat successfully appealed to racist and xenophobic sentiment within the electorate (Castles, 1986).

In Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe the conservative project has not yet fully accomplished its objectives. Yet, even if it did, it

would take some time for the ideological temperature of European politics to cool and even a longer period for a pragmatic, more liberal approach toward immigration to emerge. Within this context it must be remembered that postwar, mass migration to Western Europe was largely possible until 1973 because a broad consensus on public policy existed among economic and political elites, a consensus which was pragmatic, liberal, and receptive to the strategy of utilizing immigrant workers to remedy labor shortages (Kesselman, et. al., 1987). But, as Freeman (1986) appropriately reminds us, the extent to which labor supplies are or are not adequate is, at least in part, determined politically. Specifically, governments and political parties play a crucial role in deciding whether the expansion of the economy and increases in industrial production lead to capital-intensive modernization, production speedups, and shift work or whether indigenous labor is allowed to resist these pressures and foreign workers are recruited to fill the labor shortages created by a booming economy. Given the illiberal, political climate in contemporary Western Europe, the ascendancy of the conservative project, and the political retreat of organized labor it is probable that the initial response of governments to economic expansion and full employment in the future will be to squeeze greater productivity out of native labor and settled foreign workers. Indeed, most European governments will have little choice. Having undermined the legitimacy of their previous decision to allow mass migration, governments and political parties -- especially on the right -- have restricted their options with regard to future immigration policy.

## ANTI-IMMIGRANT ILLIBERALISM AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOR

To date, the advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism in Western Europe has not seriously undermined the principle or practice of the free movement of labor within the European Community. The hostility of elites and mass publics toward foreign workers has been directed, for the most part, toward non-EC nationals such as Pakistanis in Britain, Turks in West Germany, and North Africans in Belgium and France and not, for example, toward EC nationals such as Portuguese workers in France or Italians in Britain. Major political party leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, and the Belgian Interior Minister, Joseph Michael, have primarily confined their xenophobic rhetoric to non-EC targets. Nevertheless, there is scattered evidence that the advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism may be eroding popular support for the free movement of labor within the EC.

In France, for example, public opinion surveys conducted in the early 1980s recorded that up to half of respondents felt that there were "too many" Spaniards and Portuguese in the country (Castles et. al., 1984: 192). Politicians and officials in West Germany, in repeated, public declarations since the 1970s that Germany is not a country of immigration, do not distinguish between non-EC and EC immigration. Moreover, since the southern expansion of the Community during the 1980s, public opinion surveys have consistently indicated that there is a clear hierarchy of opinion among European publics about the "trustworthiness" of peoples from other EC countries. On the whole, the populations of traditional, labor-importing states (e.g. Britain,

France, The Netherlands, West Germany) view citizens from similar states more favorably than the populations from labor-exporting states (e.g. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) (Table 3). Of all Community peoples Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards are trusted least by West Germans. Spaniards, Italians, and Greeks are rated as least trustworthy by Britons.

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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

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The suspicions northerners harbor toward southern Europeans could, of course, dissipate in the future as Greece, Portugal, and Spain become longer-established members of the European Community. However, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that these suspicions will deepen, as the transitional periods for the entry of new member countries (recently expired for Greece and until 1992 for Portugal and Spain) end and migrants from these countries increase and circulate more freely within the EC. In this context, the decision of West Germany in 1986 to abrogate a treaty obligation which would have allowed Turkish workers greater access to the German labor movement bodes ill for the future of the EC's free movement of labor policy (Katzenstein, 1987: 266). Although Turkey remains outside the EC, the West German action demonstrates the ease with which a government, which stands to gain politically by opposing the immigration of foreign workers, can circumvent a long-standing agreement on the movement of labor. Moreover, the West German decision demonstrates that a liberal

immigration policy is not without its potential, political costs, costs which a particular Community government at a given moment in time may not be prepared to accept.

The formal admittance of Turkey into the EC would probably only further exacerbate latent divisions within the Community. It is well known that Turks are deeply distrusted in Greece and West Germany. Less well known, but equally important for assessing the impact of Turkey's entry into the EC on the Community's labor policy, is the fact that Turkish citizens are viewed more negatively than positively in every Community country except Denmark. Indeed, in the Community as a whole Turks are seen as less trustworthy than the Soviets or the Chinese (Euro-barometre, 1986).

#### CONCLUSION

For the most part, the political costs of the EC's free movement of labor policy have hitherto been minor, as general conditions of high unemployment and low economic growth in much of Western Europe since the mid-1970s have discouraged the mass migration of Community workers from one EC country to another. In the early 1980s citizens of the Community and the acceding countries living in other EC countries numbered 4.9 million, or less than one-third of all foreigners residing within the European Community. Turkey alone had as many foreign residents in the EC as Italy and Spain combined (European Communities, 1985). Moreover, as we argued above, the full impact on the EC's labor policy of adding Greece, Portugal, and Spain to the Community is not yet apparent. The transitional period for the entry of Greece into the Community ended



only recently and Spanish and Portuguese citizens do not gain complete freedom of movement within the EC until the end of 1992. As traditional labor-exporting states, these three countries can be expected to supply the EC with most of its new migrant workers during the rest of this century. How large this migration will eventually be and how well the foreign workers from these countries will be received by their host societies will not be known until perhaps the mid-1990s.

In the interim, the steady advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism in Western Europe threatens to erode the EC's commitment to the free movement of labor within the Community, and to delay the integration within European society of newly-settled foreign workers from non-Community countries. Specifically, anti-immigrant illiberalism threatens to expose the contradictions inherent in the advocacy by Community governments of a Europe without borders and the encouragement many of these governments have implicitly or explicitly given to xenophobic political forces. How these contradictions will ultimately be resolved cannot be foreseen. However, what can be foreseen is that the political costs of the EC's free movement of labor policy will increase during the 1990s and beyond. These costs will be considerable regardless of future economic conditions in Western Europe and whether or not Turkey and possibly other labor-exporting countries are admitted into the European Community.

Table 1

## FOREIGN POPULATION OF THE MAJOR LABOR-RECEIVING COUNTRIES

Country	Foreign Population	Percent Total Population
Austria	272,300	3.6
Belgium	897,630	9.1
France	4,485,715	8.2
Netherlands	558,710	3.9
Sweden	390,565	4.7
Switzerland	839,671	13.0
United Kingdom	2,151,000	3.8
West Germany	4,378,942	7.2

Source: Frey and Lubinski, 1987.

Table 2  
ANTI-IMMIGRATION FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1970

Country	Party/Movement
Belgium	National Front
Denmark	Progress Party
France	National Front
Italy	Italian Social Movement
Netherlands	Center Party
Norway	Progress Party
Switzerland	Automobile Supporters Party
	National Action
	Republican Party
United Kingdom	British Movement
	National Front
West Germany	Free German Workers Party
	German Peoples Union
	National Democratic Party

Table 3  
TRUST IN PEOPLES OF OTHER EC COUNTRIES\*

Peoples	Trustworthiness					Index
	Very	Fairly	Not Very	Not at All	DK	
Danes	14%	38%	10%	4%	34%	.59
Dutch	15	41	11	4	29	.56
Luxembourgers	11	39	10	4	36	.54
Belgians	10	42	13	5	30	.46
Germans	15	40	15	11	19	.32
Irish	9	33	18	9	31	.17
French	12	37	21	11	19	.15
British	11	38	23	11	17	.15
Spanish	7	38	26	9	20	.08
Greeks	8	31	21	10	30	.06
Portuguese	8	30	20	11	31	.04
Italians	8	34	28	10	20	.03

\*Community of 12 as a whole: weighted average

Source: Euro-Barometre, 1986.

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